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PRIVACY ON FEDERAL CIVILIAN
COMPUTER NETWORKS: A
FOURTH AMENDMENT
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
INTRUSION DETECTION NETWORK
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-terrorism' has become an issue of greater concern for both the
Clinton Administration and private industry.2 The massive wave of
cyber-attacks 3 on large Internet corporations during the second week of
1. See Clifford A. Wilke, InfrastructureThreats from Cyber-Terrorists(visited Feb. 12,
2000) <http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/99-9.txt>. The definition of cyberterrorism is
very broad including "the use of computing resources against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance
of political or social objectives." Id. "These can be operations to disrupt, deny, corrupt, or
destroy information resident in computers or available via computer networks." Id.
2. See Neil King Jr., Glenn R. Simpson, and Ann Grimes, ZDNet: Clinton Calls forlnternet-Security Summit (visited Feb. 13, 2000) <http://www.zdnet.com/filters/printerfriendly /0,6061,2436551-2,00.html>. At a meeting between the National Security Council
and top Internet executives, Jeffrey Hunker, White House director for critical infrastructure protection, stated, "We're not calling this a national-security issue per se, but on the
other hand, we're not saying, 'Oh, well, it's just the private sector,' this is something that
has affected the economy... and that alone makes it very important." Id.
3. See Wilke, supra note 1. Cyber-terrorist attacks can take many forms. Id. They
include disruption of telecommunications services or computer, satellite, or cable services,
including intrusive methods of monitoring such services. Id. Cyber-terrorists can release
information that had been stored "within or communicated through computer, cable, and
satellite or telecommunications systems." Id. Cyber-terrorists can also modify "computer
programming codes, computer network databases, stored information, or computer capabilities." Id. Furthermore, they can manipulate "computer, cable, satellite, or telecommunications services resulting in fraud, financial loss or other federal criminal violation." Id.
Finally, they can use their computer knowledge to extort government agencies or companies to destroy data or program files. Id. See also Bob Sullivan, Misconfigured Routers
Blamed for Sate of Internet Attacks (visited Feb. 13, 2000) <httpJ/www.msnbc.com/news/
368039.asp>. Internet attacks were denial-of- service attacks, which are "attacks in which
a hacker floods a network server with data with the goal of causing the system to crash."
Id. . See also Mel Duvall, ZDNet: Web Attacks Spur Hack Insurance (visited Feb. 13, 2000)
<httpJ/www.zdnet.com /zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2436984,00.html>. In the wake of the
February 2000 attacks by hacker, Insurers against Internet hackers have had an increase

in demand for their service. Id.
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February 20004 called into question the need for government regulation
or monitoring 6 of its own networks. The inherent problem with monitoring the networks is that it may be interpreted as an erosion of privacy
rights. There is no doubt that privacy is an important concern for users
because every day, more and more people are spending more time on the
Internet for a wide variety of functions. 7 However, a network user's
right to privacy must be weighed against the government's interests and
those of private corporations. 8 The fight against cyber-terrorists is similar to fighting a guerrilla war. Rather, this problem will require eternal
vigilance, 9 meaning the government may have to utilize Fourth Amendment exceptions to protect cyberspace from the certain attacks made
against government computer networks.
Imagine if one morning you woke up and heard a newscast announcing 10 that the non-public computer network systems for the Department
of the Labor, 1 ' the Department of Justice, and the Department of Energy
were all attacked. Experts believe that it may be weeks before they can
regain control. The Department of Labor has lost 25% of its data, leav4. See Laurent Belsie, Wake-up Week for Web Security HackerAttacks on Several Major Sites Reveal Difficulty of Safeguarding the Internet from IncreasingThreats, Christian
Science Monitor, Friday, Feb. 11, 2000, at CHSM 1. The attacks were based against Yahoo!, eBay, Amazon.com, Buy.com, ZDNet, eTrade. Id.; See also Connie Guglielmo, Web
Attacks by the ABCs (visited Feb. 13, 2000) <http:/www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/comment /
0,5859,2435990,00.html>. The author here suggests that there may have been a serial
cyber-terrorist, who made it nearly through the alphabet when he was implementing his
denial of service attacks on the Internet top sites. Id.
5. See Chris Cobbs, Does Uncle Sam Want to be Your Big Brother? Computers, User
Privacy and the Law Technology is FarOutpacingEfforts to Protect Users'Rights, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Nov. 21, 1999, at G1.
6. See discussion infra note 19, of the President's plan to monitor federal civilian networks under FIDNet.
7. See Annette Hamilton, ZDNet: News: Rush Home to Surf? Join the Crowd (visited
Feb. 13, 2000) <http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2435087,00.html>.
Research has suggested that nearly 25% of the 110 "online" Americans come home from work
and spend all all evening online. Id.
8. See discussion infra note 19, of private industry's right as a member of the critical
infrastructure to pay the burden of securing their respective portion of the nation's
economy.
9. See Jim Rapoza, ZDNet: News: Web Attacks Give New Meaning to 'Eternal Vigilance' (visited Feb. 13, 2000) <http://www.zdnet.com/pcweek/stories/columns
/
0,4351,2435465,00.html> (quotingThomas Jefferson).
10. Although the following is purely hypothetical, in light of the February 2000 attacks
certainly this scenario could be possible.
11. See Brock Meeks, Alan Boyle and Bob Sullivan, ZDNet: News: Hack Attack Knocks
out FBI site (visited Feb. 13, 2000) <http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/
0,4586,2266648,00.html>. The FBI Internet site was taken down in retaliation for serving
search warrants on Global Hell (gH) a well-known hacker group. Id.
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ing the costs well into the millions. 12 The government has attempted to
find out who crashed the systems but as yet has had no success. One
Internet rumor claims that the attack was brought about by Arab fundamentalists from Afghanistan. 13 However, there have also been reports
that this attack was brought about by small groups and their simultaneous occurrence is merely coincidence. If the government had been able to
monitor traffic to the federal agency's non-public networks to respond
cross department reaction more quickly, the outcome might have been
different.
14
The President's National Plan for Information System Protection
is designed to protect America's infrastructure from just this type of
cyber-attack. 15 The plan calls for the creation of the Federal Intrusion
Detection Network (FIDNet), i 6 which will be responsible for monitoring
the federal departments and agencies. 17 While FIDNet is being designed
to monitor the entry of Federal non-public computers for intrusion, it is
not yet being considered for private computer networks or Internet
sites.18 The privacy problem with FIDNet arises when private users access federal civilian non-public networks and are subject to monitoring.
The President's Plan calls for cooperation between the federal government and private industry.' 9 As of August 2000, the Plan was in the
early stages with respect to the private industries the government has
12. See Jennifer Mack, ZDNet: Attack Victims Count their Losses (visited Feb. 13,
2000) <http'//www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2436501,00.html>. The companies
attacked on the second week of February 2000 have stated that the losses are relatively
insignificant. Id.
13. See John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism (visited Feb. 13, 2000) <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/
MR989/MR989.pdf/MR989.chap3.pdf>.
14. See Version 1.0 [hereinafter President's Plan].
15. See Defending America's Cyberspace: National Plan for Information Systems Protection, i (Pub. Papers Jan. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Defending America's Cyberspace].
16. See id. at xix. "These intrusion detection systems are already in use in the Executive Branch and Congress." Id.
17. See id. at xix.
18. See Christopher J. Dorobek, FIDnet Will Monitor Federal, not Private,Nets, Administration says, Government Computer News, October 25, 1999, at 9. Originally the
FIDNet plan was to include private computers in the monitoring system. Id. This included
corporate computers that were part of the critical infrastructure. Id.
19. See Defending America's Cyberspace, supra note 15, at iii. The President would
like the government to form a close relationship with the representatives of private industry as well as those of public services that are involved in the critical infrastructure of the
country. Id. The President's Plan does not want to have to achieve the goals through regulation. Id. Rather, the President sees possible regulation as an impediment to the achievement of protecting American's Cyberspace. Id. The President's Plan also does not want to
micromanage the critical infrastructure. Id. Rather, the individual sectors of the critical
infrastructure will determine for itself "what practices, procedures, and standards are necessary for it to protect its key systems." Id.
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identified as part of the economy's critical infrastructure. 20 The President's Plan initially arose out of President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63).21 Directive 63 was signed in 1998 and
required the assessment of America's cyber-defenses. 22 The President's
Plan is a by-product of PDD 63.23 Although the Plan is currently voluntary for private industry, what would happen if cyber-attacks became an
everyday occurrence? The federal government might take a heavy hand
to watch over its commercial Internet "little brother." In fact, the President's Plan has already been criticized for giving the FBI too much responsibility and for failing to give control over to the agencies with the
24
most experience in this area.
This comment will explore the relationship between the privacy of
the users of the federal non-public civilian computer networks and the
government's power to monitor such networks. The background will explain what a network is, how cyber-terrorists can greatly damage a system, what the government is planning to do about the problem, and the
constitutional protections involved. The analysis will examine the
Fourth Amendment and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and
consider their respective effects on the implementation of FIDNet, while
determining if any exceptions would allow the FIDNet plan to go forward
in the face of Fourth Amendment rights.

20. See ComputerSecurity: Clinton Announces Plan, Seeks Funds to Combat Threats to
Computer Security, BNA Washington Insider, Jan. 10, 2000.
21. See Computer Technology Security: Hearing before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism & Government Information, 106th
Cong. (2000) (statement of Robert F. Bennett).
22. See id. "PDD 63 required the Executive Branch to assess the vulnerabilities of
computer-based systems and to remedy deficiencies in order to become a model of information security. PDD 63 called for the development of a detailed federal plan to protect U.S.
critical infrastructures and to defend America against information warfare." Id.
23. See id. "As the Plan notes, it is in fact an invitation to a dialogue - an important
first step." Id.
24. See id. Bennett states that there are two main things wrong with the plan: First,
the architecture is flawed in its structure:The FBI is given the coordination function, which
immediately raises DoD and industry suspicions as well as turf battles. The plan focuses
on the hacker threat, not the broader threat of information warfare. The plan fails to articulate a strategy for reconstitution and recovery if an attack occurs. DOD and NSA have
the most experience, but their roles are uncertain.Second, the Administration's organization makes it difficult to follow the money. Approximately nine committees have some CIP
oversight responsibility over $2.04 billion spread across 15 agencies. Of the $2.04 billion in
the 2001 budget that is tagged for CIP, $276 million would be new funding. Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

COMPUTER NETWORKS

Computer networks 2 5 are designed to enable computers and users to
communicate with each other and share information. 26 While there are
27
many benefits in using a network as opposed to stand-alone computers,
the greatest advantage is that it allows resources, data, and applications
to be shared. 28 Networks allow computers to reach their full
29
capability.
There are two types of networks: a peer-to-peer network and a cli31
ent-server network.3 0 In a peer-to-peer network, there is no hierarchy.
As the name implies, every workstation has the same "authority" to access data as any other workstation, so every workstation has access to
the same resources as any other. 3 2 The advantages of this type of network are that it provides efficient information sharing among users on
the network. 3 3 However, this type of configuration also has serious security drawbacks. 34 One workstation operator may be able to access information on another workstation that the other operator wants to keep
35
private or secure.
25. See Lee James McMunn, This page containsan overview of computer networks (visited Feb. 13, 2000) <http'//www.awstevenson.demon.co.uk/SYSNOTES/comnet.htm>.
"Computer data network may be defined as a number of computers and related devices
interconnected by one or more transmission paths." Id.
26. See Computer Network (visited Feb. 13, 2000) <http'//chaminade.org/mis/NETWORKS.HTM>. Computer networks have two or more computers that are connected to
form a communication system. Id. This system can include printers, scanners, or and
other peripheral device. Id. The communication system 'allows users to share information
and resources." Id. "In contrast, a stand-alone computer stores all data on its own disk
drives and is physically connected to each of its peripheral devices." Id.
27. See id. Consider the following example: "In a school computer lab with thirty
stand-alone computers you would need to purchase thirty printers if you wanted each student to print from his/her computer." Id. In contrast, if you had thirty networked computers (called workstations) each of them could print over the network to a single printer."
Id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Computer Network (visited Feb. 13, 2000) <http'//chaminade.org/mis/NETWORKS.HTM>. A good example might be a particular workstations' hard disk or CDROM drive. Id. Each of these would be a "resource that all the other workstations could
access. No single computer manages or controls the peer to peer network; all workstations
are equal. Examples of peer to peer network operating systems are Windows for Workgroups, Windows95, and Artisoft Lantastic."Id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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Client-server networks are much more secure. 36 Under this type of
network, the server is the ultimate authority. 3 7 Client workstations
make requests to the server for data, and the server will only deliver the
38
data if the client is properly authorized to receive that data.
When a person attempts to access 39 a protected network-generally
one that contains valuable information that must be safeguarded-a
user identification and user password are often required. 40 There are
three steps that a user must complete to gain access to the network. The
first step is to let the network servers know that the user wants to begin
the login process. 4 1 Once the network is aware that a user is attempting
to access it, the network server tries to determine who the user is and
whether the user has authority to log in to the network. 4 2 Finally, once
the network server has determined that the user identification is proper,
the password is examined to make sure it is valid-that it exactly
43
matches the password assigned to the user by a network manager.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Computer Network (visited Feb. 13, 2000) <http://chaminade.org/mis/NETWORKS.HTM>. "The client (customer) is the workstation that connects to a server
(owner), which in turn provides services." Id.
39. See id.
40. See id. "It is the Network Manager's responsibility to handle these tasks." Id. For
example, a Network Manager would add a new user to the system and determine to which
resources, applications, and data the user can access (called assigning rights)." Id.
41. See id.
The first step is to find the location of login, or find the doorway. The server needs
to be aware that there is someone wishing to access it. To tell it that you wish to
access the network you must use the command LOGIN. When you type the word
LOGIN and press ENTER you are telling the computer to begin the process of
giving you access to its resources. In some operating systems such as Windows95 a
dialog box appears to help you through this log in process.
Id.
42. See id.
In this second step you must tell the network who is attempting to gain access so a
to verify the authenticity of the proposed user. In essence the network will ask
you 'Who are you?' Since it cannot orally ask you this, it displays the phrase Enter
your login name on the bottom of the monitor. Every network user has a unique
user name that is also called the login name. The login name is assigned by the
Network Manager.
Id.
43. See ComputerNetwork, supra note 38. The final step is to "verify that you are who
you say you are." Id. Just think if you knocked on your friend's door might she recognize
you simply from the sound of the knock, or would you have to call out that it was you. Id. A
network cannot recognize who the person attempting access simply by accessing a login
page much in the same way your friend could not know who was at the door simply by a
knock. Id. This is why a network "uses a secret password to confirm who you are" in the
same way that your friend may rely on your voice or, perhaps, might look through a peephole just to make sure that you are who you say you are. Id. Unique passwords "assigned
by the Network Manager and it should be changed frequently." Id. When you type in this
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This concept works whether the user is physically connected to the
server, such as through a computer lab workstation wired into the
school's main server, or outside the physical building using a dial-in or
remote connection.4
Once inside the network, users have access to the information in the
server subject to certain conditions. For example, users may have different rights45 from one another. 4 6 In a university setting, for example, a
student may view certain files, such as her class syllabus but may not
change or destroy files in the syllabus folder on the server. 4 7 These
rights are associated with the user's identification and password.48 Most
often, rights are set for specific "areas" on the server, such as a certain
49
set of directory folders.
With the dawn of the Internet, however, unauthorized access
problems have become critical. The Internet is simply a gigantic clientserver system on a wide-area network (WAN) 50 that gives anyone with a
password you will notice that as you type nothing appears on the monitor. This is the way
the file server keeps your password secret-it does not display anything on the monitor as
you type." Id.
44. See id.
45. See id. By rights it is meant the ability to access certain information that may
have been designated restricted according to some classification system. Id.
46. See id. Many times this depends on your classification within an organization such
as a company or school. Id.
47. See id. "Students might have the right to create files in certain folders, but they
may be restricted from deleting files or modifying certain ones. A user might not be able to
print on certain networked printers, access a certain network drive, or start a particular
application program." Id.
48. See id.
49. See Computer Network, supra note 38. They indicate whether the user can access
the folders at all, which is sometimes referred to as whether or not the user can "see" the
folders. Id. If the user can see a certain set of folders, the PC user is given one of two types
of access to those folders: "read" or "write" permissions. Id. Read access (sometimes called
"read-only access") means that the user can view files or documents within the folder, but
they cannot edit or delete those files. Id. Write access (sometimes called "read-write" access) allows the user not only to view files but to edit and delete the files as well. See also
Webopedia Definition and Links (visited Mar. 26, 2000) <http://webopedia.internet.coml
Datalread-only.html>; Webopedia Definition and Links (visited Mar. 26, 2000) <http'/
webopedia.internet.com/Data/readwrite.html>. The significance of these various level of
access is that often network administrators believe that they have protected parts of the
network from unauthorized access. See Computer Network, supra note 43. The login process and the various access levels provide protections to the entire network or to specific
parts of the network. Id.
50. See What is a WAN? (visited Mar. 26, 2000) <http://www.dcninc.com/
whatawan.htm>. A WAN, on the other hand, includes computers that are outside this type
of "hardwired" network. Id. For example, if the law office above opened a new branch in
another town, they may want to connect the two offices. Id. The individual machines on
the network are too far apart for the law firm to "hardwire" them, so the local phone company provides some of the connectivity. Id. For example, they may set up dial-up connec-
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computer and a modem access to certain data residing on Internet serv5 l
ers. However, the problem arises when network administrators mistakenly believe that the "private" portions of their networks are secure.
Network administration is extremely complex, and Internet technology
is so new that many administrators do not yet appreciate the many ways
their networks can be breached. A "firewall" is the layer of protection on
a server that keeps unauthorized users out of protected portions of a
52
network.
The Internet was created in the 1960's as a means to connect all of
the various networks at research institutions to ease the access of information between research scientists. 53 Similar to single computers, these
tions, so a user in one office must use a modem and dial the other office to connect. Id.
This is the way most home users access the Internet - through dial-up modem connections.
Id. The office may also choose to use "dedicated' lines, meaning that they lease a permanent connection from the phone company. This is the way most large businesses access
other parts of the company and access the Internet through permanent, dedicated connections. A local-area network ("LAN"), on the other hand, is entirely contained within a relatively small physical area, such as a single building. LAN (visited Apr. 3, 2000) <http://
www.whatis.com/lan.htm>. It may be as small as two or three computers linked together,
or as large as an entire corporate office building. Id. The workstations making up the
network are physically linked with cable that runs from one machine to another and generally includes printers, routers, and other network hardware. Id. For example, a small law
firm purchases ten PCs, five printers, and a server (which is generally a very powerful PC
running special server software). Id. They would also purchase the physical cable to connect these machines, and a network operation team of people would physically unroll the
cable and connect each of the machines together. Id. The cable allowing communication
between the PCs and the server are completely controlled by the company and they are
physically contained within the office space. Id. The only way for someone with another
PC to access this type of network is to log onto one of the existing PCs or to physically bring
a new PC into the office, run another length of cable, and physically connect the new PC to
the network. Id.
51. See Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2000, System Administrator (visited
0
Mar. 29, 2000) <http://encarta.msn.com/find/Concise.asp?z=l&pg=2&ti=O1C3300 >. System Administrator, in computer science, the person responsible for administering use of a
multiuser computer system, communications system, or both. Id. A system administrator
performs such duties as assigning user accounts and passwords, establishing security access levels, and allocating storage space, as well as being responsible for other tasks such
as watching for unauthorized access and preventing virus or Trojan horse programs from
entering the system. Id. A related term, sysop (system operator), generally applies to a
person in charge of a bulletin board system, although the distinction is only that a system
administrator is associated with large systems owned by businesses and corporations,
whereas a sysop usually administers a smaller, often home-based, system. Id.
52. See What is a Firewall? (visited Mar. 13, 2000) <http://www.digi4fun.com/ConSeal3.html>. A firewall is used to prevent unauthorized persons from gaining entry onto a
computer network. Id. They also prevent persons from going to particular sites that have
been forbidden by a systems operator. Id. Persons with computer port scanner, not to be
confused with the graphical interface used to make computer files of hard copy images, can
gain entry to vulnerable computers. Id.
53. See CHARLEs PLATT, ANARCHy ONLmE NET CRImE 38-39 (1996).
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networks were isolated, and had to be connected to each other. 54 All of
the networks were connected to the Advanced Research Projects Agency
Network ("ARPANet"). 5 5 ARPANet was designed so that there would be
no centralized switching center. 56 The design allowed ARPANet to con57
tinue operating even after a severe attack from a foreign government.
The system worked even if several of the computers in the ARPANet
failed to work. 58 The Internet is very similar in design to ARPANet,5 9
which provides the Internet the enormous added benefit of an inherent
defense due simply to its design.

B.

CYBER-ATACKS

60
Cyber-terrorists can use a variety of means to attack a network.
Unlike traditional forms of terrorism, where capital expenditures went
into coordinated physical attacks, information warfare requires very little money and even less exposure. However, like more traditional forms
of terrorism, the numbers of persons involved is low, thereby keeping all
casualties to a minimum. 6 1 In fact, all that is really needed to effect a
heavy attack are a telephone, computer, hacker software, and a
modem. 6 2 Furthermore, attacks do not have to take the form of actual
destruction. Rather, one type of cyber-attack, for example, could be the
simple monitoring of telecommunication, cable, computer, or satellite

54. See id.
55. See id.; What is ARPANet (a Definition) (visited Feb. 27, 2000)<http://
www.whatis.com/arpanet.htm>.
56. See Platt, supra note 53, at 38-39. "[Elach node in the network was smart enough
to operate independently, routing messages to other nodes on its own initiative." Id. "Electronic mail followed an unpredictable zigzag path, skipping from one site to the next, using
any connection that happened to be lightly loaded at that particular moment." Id. This
type of organization is similar to that of modern terrorist groups. Id. In fact, it is they who
have begun to realize that the highly centralized hierarchies provide for easy destruction in
times of conflict. See also Arquilla, Rondfeldt, and Zanini, supra note 13.
57. See Platt, supra note 53, at 38-39.
58. See id. "The original system, ARPANet was fault-tolerant." Id. This means that
virtually nothing could prevent it from sending the information to the next node. Id. This
type of system would allow it to function even in the most dangerous of situations. Id. For
example, "[wihen a node in Chicago went down, messages could just as easily pass through
Detroit [because] the system was supposed to be usable in a national emergency." Id.
59. See id. The Internet is based on the National Science Foundation ("NSFNet"),
which in 1987 began to connect private computers together. Id.
60. See Bob Sullivan, MisconfiguredRouters Blamed for Spate of InternetAttacks, (visited Feb. 13, 2000) <http'//www.msnbc.com/news/368039.asp>. The second week of February cyber-attacks used denial-of-service attacks. Id.
61. Here casualties does not refer to the loss of human life in the process of fulflling a
mission. Rather it refers to simply being arrested by some authority for the breaking into
of the targeted computers.
62. See Wilke, supra note 1.
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systems. 6 3 Besides denial-of-service attacks, there are worm attacks, domain-name-service hijackings, logic bombs or Trojan horses, and mail
bombings. 64 Worm attacks are used to overload the system by having
the program reproduce itself on the server.65 Domain-name-service
hijackings are used to prevent Internet users from gaining access to a
particular Internet site by rerouting all inquiries from that site to a completely different location, thereby making the original Internet site unavailable to the requester. 6 6 Logic bombs are programs that when
triggered may disrupt the entire computer system by making the entire
disk unreadable.6 7 Finally, there are e-mail attacks, or mail bombings.
These include bombarding a specific e-mail account with thousands of
messages to shut down the recipient's e-mail server or e-mail access. Email attacks may also involve Trojan horse programs that are attached
to e-mails. When the curious user runs the program, it operates like a
logic bomb or Trojan horse and can disrupt the user's PC or the entire
network. There are even e-mail Trojan horse programs designed to selfreplicate themselves by automatically e-mailing a copy of the attacking
message to everyone in the user's e-mail address book. 68
Law enforcement can stop cyber-terrorists in a variety of ways. One
way, not currently supported by the Clinton administration, is to allow
for higher levels of encryption. 69 Since the level of encryption determines the level of data security, it is natural to want a higher level of
encryption when dealing with increasingly sensitive data. Of course,
this also means that cyber-terrorists can communicate more effectively,
because government officials would be required to break codes hackers
70
employed to encrypt their information.
63. See id.
64. See Sullivan, supra note 60.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. "These programs could be used to launch broad-based attacks that would
be difficult to defend against and impossible to trace back to the hacker." Id. See also
Introduction to Viruses (visited Sept. 25, 2000) <httpJ/www.stiller.com/vintro.htm>.
68. See id.
69. See Peter Coffee, Analysis: Clinton Passed up a Golden IT Opportunity (visited
Feb. 13, 2000) <http://www.zdnet.com/pcweek/stories/news/0,4153,2429104,00.html>. The
President stressed the concern for the integrity of critical institutions and our personal
safety as he commented on the natural effects of Internet technology. Id. Calling for the
"protection of medical and financial records, conveniently omitting to mention his own administration's continual attempts to weaken our privacy by imposing impracticable technologies (such as key escrow) and by the unconstitutional broadening of police powers (such
as covert hard-disk searches and pre-encryption monitoring of data-entry operations)." Id.
70. See id. The Clinton Administration has been willing to grant greater access to
higher security but only at the price of privacy in the form of key escrows. Id.
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THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT AND THE
PRESIDENT'S PLAN

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") was enacted in
1986 to update Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968-the federal wiretap law. 7 1 The purpose of the act was to
modify privacy protections so that such protections might be modernized
relative to technological advancements. 7 2 The Framers of the Constitution did not realize the advances in technology that would occur in the
years to come. 7 3 The telephone is an example of such a technological
advancement of which the Framers might never have dreamed. However, as is obvious today, the tapping of a telephone line is one of the
easiest ways for the government to acquire information. 7 4 The ECPA
was enacted to address these sorts of new applications that the Framers
could not have provided for with the Fourth Amendment
The President's Plan was created as a result of PDD 63, and the
government will challenge the private sector to secure America's computer systems by taking the lead and acting as the role model for suc71. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.

1848 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, 2701-2710, 3117, 3121-3126 (1988)). S.
Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. There are three sections to
the ECPA. Id. Title I of the ECPA concerns the interception of wire, oral and electronic
communications that affects interstate commerce or foreign commerce. See S. Rep. No. 99541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. Title I implicitly excludes oral communication as being protected by defining the communication that is protected as: "transfer of
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or a photooptical system
that affects foreign or interstate commerce." Id. Title II addresses the access of stored
information or transactional records and communications and is "modeled after the Right
to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. 3401 et seq. to protect privacy interests in personal and
proprietary information, while protecting the Government's legitimate law enforcement
needs." Id. Title III addresses trap and trace devices as well as pen registers. Id. Together
they combine to form Congress' answer to the technological advancements that have occurred over the years. Id.
72. See S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. The purpose
of the Act is to "protect against the unauthorized interception of electronic communications." Id. The Bill was designed to update the 1968 law and "clarify Federal privacy standards in light of dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications technologies."
Id.
73. See id. The vision of the Framers of the Constitution was somewhat limited by
what the methods of governmental intrusion at the time. Id. When they discussed the
methods of governmental intrusion, they thought in terms of physical intrusion, intrusions
such as those in to the "house, papers, and effects." Id. Those things that have traditionally been held as intrusive have been limited by the Fourth Amendment. Id. Foresight is
limited, and as such accommodations need be made to accompany unforeseen change. Id.
This is what the ECPA intends to accomplish. Id.
74. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

1060

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

(Vol. XVIII

cess. 75 The President's Plan will protect several key infrastructure
sectors within the economy. 7 6 However, the entire plan to protect the
critical infrastructure will be voluntary for both private industry and the
states and will be mandatory only for federal agency systems. 7 7 It is
uncertain what information the private sector will be requested to submit to the government to participate in this protective partnership.
However, as the Plan progresses, expectations of the private sector
should be clarified. 78 After the February cyber-attacks, there may be a
heightened level of cooperation between the federal government and private industry.
The President's Plan calls for the creation of FIDNet, 79 a system
75. See Computer Technology Security: Hearing before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism & Government Information, 106th
Cong. (Feb. 1, 2000) (statement of John S. Tritak, Director Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office). President Clinton challenged the Federal Government in a way not challenged for some time. Id. He specifically wants the Federal Government to be the "model
for critical infrastructure protection-to put our own house in order first." Id.
76. See Defending America's Cyberspace, supra note 15, at ii. "This directive requires
that the Executive Branch assess the cyber vulnerabilities of the Nation's critical infrastructures-information and communications, energy, banking and finance, transportation,
water supply, emergency services, and public health, as well as those authorities responsible for the continuity of federal, state, and local governments." Id. This plan is all-inclusive. Id. Depending on how one defines each of these sectors, more than half of the
economy could fall under this new plan. Id. What type of privacy would be left to the
legitimate user of the Internet once this plan were to be followed by corporations on the
Internet? Id. Another related issue will be the ability of the federal government to force
the States to comply with this plan. Id.
77. See id. The President's Plan requires that the government and private sector work
together. Id. The type of cooperation required for such a plan unparalleled. Id. The President sees that the only way to protect all of America's critical infrastructure cyberspace is
for our "Nation as a whole [to] rise to [the] challenge." Id. at iii. The President, believing
that the private sector would not cooperate if the government were to mandate such a
solution, decided that the government must lead by example. Id. To do so, the President
pledged that the government would be ready to help so as to ensure that the partnership of
providing for the defense of America's critical infrastructure cyberspace would become a
reality in the near future. Id.
78. See id. at iii.
79. See id. FI)Net will monitor Federal civilian Agencies and Department computers
by detecting intrusion at critical system nodes. Id. at 13, 39. Significantly, FIDNet is
structured carefully to identify a small class of intrusions. FIDNet focuses on attacks upon
Federally owned, non-public networks or domains. FIDNet allows each of the participating
Government Agencies to continue monitoring its own systems, in accordance with existing
law. A preliminary legal review by the Justice Department has concluded that, subject to
certain limitations, the FIDNet concept complies with the ECPA. However, an interagency
legal review team continues to look at FIDNet issues and implications of the ECPA and
many other statutes such as the Privacy Act of 1974 as the FIDNet concept continues to
develop. Id. at 3-4. FIDNet will create an "automated system for incident reporting and
handling." Id. at 13. The General Services Administration ("GSA") will operate a "centrally managed operational structure for processing, disseminating, warning, and coordi-

2000]

FEDERAL CIVILIAN COMPUTER NETWORKS

1061

that uses thousands of software programs8 0 to monitor the federal government's computers for suspicious activity, such as indications of computer network intrusions.8 1 The project has been described as a burglar
alarm.8 2 First, information regarding unauthorized attempts to access a
system will be collected by the respective government agency.8 3 Second,
anomalies would be reported to the General Services Administration
("GSA") for further analysis.8 4 Thus, FIDNet would not allow the GSA
to monitor at all. Traditionally, the monitoring of computer system security has been left to the system administrator of the respective agency
or department.8 5
FIDNet will enhance the intrusion detection systems that many
agencies already have in place,8 6 and it will link federal agencies tonating status of the affected infrastructure systems." Id. at 13. See also Computer
Technology Security: Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee
on Technology, Terrorism & Government Information, 106th Cong. (Feb. 1, 2000) (statement of Marc Rotenberg) [hereinafter Rotenberg testimony]. "The Plan views the Internet
as a domestic communications structure that must be secured from above from foreign
threats. But the original architects of the network knew better. A communications network that can be secured from above can also be taken out from above." Id.
80. See Rotenberg testimony, supra note 79. "Networks of thousands of software monitoring programs would constantly track computer activities, looking for indications of computer network intrusions and other illegal acts." Id.
81. See id. This capability will function in concert with GSA's Federal Computer Incident Response Capability, and assist Federal Agencies to detect and analyze computer attacks and unauthorized intrusions; share attack warnings and related information across
Agencies; and respond to attacks in accordance with existing procedures and mechanisms.
82. See Computer Technology Security: Hearing before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary Subcommittee on Computer Security, 106th Cong. (Feb. 1, 2000) (statement of
John Tritak). "The program - much like a centralized burglar alarm system - would operate within long-standing, well-established legal requirements and Government policies
covering privacy and civil liberties." Id. But see Rotenberg testimony, supra note 79. "An
open-ended monitoring authority that essentially gives a single federal agency the authority to track the communications across all federal computer networks." Id. Such an authority is not founded on current statutory provisions. Id.
83. See Computer Security: Congressional Testimony, 106th Cong. (Mar. 9, 2000)
(statement of John Tritak). Intrusion information would be collected by the "Agency experts" or their systems operators. Id.
84. See id. Only when the agency sees anomalous activity will it further that information on to the GSA. Id. FIDNet will "not become a pass-through for information to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation or other law enforcement entities." Id. Law enforcement
would receive information about computer attacks and intrusions only under long-standing
legal rules-no new authorities are implied or envisioned by the FIDNet program." Id.
85. See Memorandum from Ronald Lee, Associate Deputy Attorney General, on Comments on the National Information Systems Protection Plan to Jeffrey Hunker, Director
Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (March 8, 1999) (on file with the Electronic Privacy Information Center at <httpJ/www.epic.org/security/cip/lee-memo.html>. [hereinafter
Lee memo].
86. See Protecting Information Infrastructure: Hearing before the Senate judiciary
Committee Subcommittee on Technology and Terrorism, 106th Cong. (October 6, 1999)
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gether to allow more solid security across the federal government.8 7 In
addition to alerting the GSA, the system will report anomalous activity
to the National Infrastructure Protection Center ("NIPC")8 8 to alert the
other Federal network protection systems, providing for a kind of early
warning system. Another extremely important aspect of FIDNet is the
voluntary sharing of information from the private sector to the federal
government, which occurred during the early February 2000 cyberattacks.

D.

FOURTH AMENDMENT
89

The Fourth Amendment prevents the government from infringing on
a citizen's natural and inalienable right 90 to be left alone by the government in order to pursue his or her own beliefs and thoughts. 9 1 Furthermore, the Framers intended that the Fourth Amendment protect all
citizens from the encroachment of the state upon their natural liberties. 9 2 This right is not limited to persons in their homes. It attaches to
an individual and will protect the individual wherever the individual
travels. 93 The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment has
(statement of Michael A. Vatis, Director of the National Infrastructure Protection Center,
Federal Bureau of Investigation).
87. See id. "FIDNet will enhance agencies' cyber security by linking their intrusion
detection systems together so that suspicious patterns of activity can be detected and alerts
issued across agencies." Id.
88. See id. The purpose of the NIPC is to provide early warning of attacks and to
attempt to gather information about the attacker. Id.
89. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.
90. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The
relevant constitutional provisions are limitations on the power of the sovereign to infringe
on the liberty of the citizen." Id. "I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed
by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights. Id. "It is that basic
freedom which the Due Process Clause protects, rather than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations." Id.
91. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). "The [framers].. .recognized the
significance of man's spiritual nature... his feelings and... intellect [knowing] that only a
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things." Id.
92. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 230.
93. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968). The Terry Court recognized that right to
privacy from unreasonable searches by the government is very broad:
This inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the
streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his
secret affairs. For, as this Court has always recognized, 'No right is held more
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three requirements: 1) unbiased warrants 2) issued in ongoing investigations for 3) specific objects or information. The first requirement is that
disinterested magistrates should issue all warrants. 94 Lord Mansfield
held over two centuries ago that limitations on the information sought
should be left to a judge, not the officer seeking the information. 95 The
second requirement is that the government should state the probable
cause for requiring the individual's liberty to give way to the interest of
the government. 9 6 This generally involves showing-that the subject of
the warrant will further an ongoing criminal investigation. 9 7 This preserves a person's liberty to be free from governmental interference by
preventing investigations into a person's history before a crime has even
been committed. 98 Finally, the third requirement forces the government
to describe with particularity what it is attempting to seize for its ongoing investigation. 9 9 The government is not afforded the opportunity to
voluntarily comply the Fourth Amendment, nor can the government offer to use the least intrusive means to gather evidence for the purposes of
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.'

Id.
94. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979).
95. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972) (citing
Leach v. Three of the King's Messengers, 19 How.St.Tr. 1001, 1027 (1765)). See also Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250 (1977). The Court was presented with a case where the
justice of the peace, who was paid for his services, issued a warrant. Id. "It is, in other
words, another situation where the defendant is subjected to what surely is judicial action
by an officer of a court who has 'a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest' in his
conclusion to issue or to deny the warrant." Id. See also United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1972). "The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate
the executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their duty
and responsibility are to enforce the laws, to investigate, and to prosecute." Id. The Court
goes on to say that to allow the Executive branch to issue its own search warrants not
subject to the neutrality of the judiciary is to give the Executive carte blanche. Id. Such
"unreviewed executive discretion [that] may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected speech." Id.
96. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967). "There must, of course, be a
nexus-automatically provided in the case of fruits, instrumentalities or contraband-between the item to be seized and criminal behavior." Id. See also United States, 407 U.S. at
318. "Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the time-tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment rights." Id.
97. See Dalia, 441 U.S. at 255.
98. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972). "The
further requirement of 'probable cause' instructs the magistrate that baseless searches
shall notproceed." Id. They must further demonstrate that "'the evidence sought will aid in
a particular apprehension or conviction' for a particular offense." Id.
99. See id. at 316 (citing Leach v. Three of the King's Messengers, 19 How.St.Tr. 1001,
1027 (1765)) (stating that "common-law principles prohibited warrants that ordered the
arrest of unnamed individuals who the officer might conclude were guilty of seditious libel."). Id.
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an ongoing criminal investigation.10 0 The requirement of particularity
prevents the government from showing probable cause and then making
broad and general searches of the accused person or her home. 10 1 It also
prevents the government from seizing items that have not been described in the warrant.10 2 The less that is left up to law enforcement
agencies, the less likely that an individual's Fourth Amendment rights
will be infringed.' 0 3 These three requirements are intended to prevent
10 4
the government from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

FOURTH AMENDMENT AND EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY

Increased Internet use has raised questions regarding the issue of pri-

vacy against government intrusion.' 0 5 The FIDNet plan is being attacked because it lacks a legal foundation.' 0 6 Whenever someone uses a
network, they send packets of information from their computer to another computer.' 0 7 These packets are subject to interception by a systems operator when she monitors the network to which she is
assigned.' 0 8 While the FIDNet plan specifically addresses the problems
with intrusion on non-public federal computer networks, FIDNet, however, may serve as a model for corporate Internet monitoring plans or
federal plans to monitor intrusion on public networks.' 0 9 Therefore, it
100. See Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967). "[This Court has never
sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence

of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means
consistent with that end." Id.
101. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). Requiring search warrants to
describe with particularity the objects to be seized proscribes all-purpose searches. Id.
This also has the effect of preventing the police from coming into the home of a person with
a search warrant, but to make some general search of the house in hopes to find evidence of
other crimes. Id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968).
105. At the same time that FIDNet is presented as a vital security protection, it has farreaching privacy implications that some users may not find acceptable as a trade-off for
inhanced protection against governmental or commercial interruptions.
106. See Rotenberg testimony, supra note 79. "There is no 'cyber threat' exception to
the Fourth Amendment." Id. "The fact that the government announces that a warrantless
search may occur is hardly a sufficient legal basis to permit such searches to take place."
Id. However, as will be shown, there is ample authority upon which the FIDNet plan to
rest.
107. See How Does the Net Work? (visited Mar. 26, 2000) <http://coverage.cnet.com/Content/Features/Techno/Networks/ss02.html>.
108. See id.
109. This could be a problem, because the expectation of privacy would be different on
the Internet. While many sites do have privacy policies that are located on the bottom of a
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becomes important to analyze network monitoring in relation to the potential privacy problems. In order to address these privacy concerns, the
Fourth Amendment and the ECPA will govern both the President's Plan
and FIDNet.
The FIDNet plan would not be effective if the government were encumbered by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment because of the
sheer number of persons accessing federal civilian networks and the inability of the government to obtain search warrants on every person.
There is good reason to scrutinize the government when it acts without
the requirement of a warrant. The strict requirements for establishing a
connection between the information sought and some criminal behavior,11 0 and for obtaining permission to search, are crucial because authorities may otherwise be tempted to overlook privacy rights in their
zeal to solve an ongoing investigation."' This conflict between individual privacy and law enforcement efforts illustrates the need for an independent magistrate who can make an objective determination of the
sufficiency of the evidence of a crime before allowing the government to
override the individual's privacy interest.1 1 2 The particularity requirement also helps guard against an officer simply going out to a house and
searching for anything at all that happens to be incriminating, whatever
the item, and whatever the alleged crime."i 3 In other words, it ensures
that information must be subject to an ongoing investigation before it
can be collected. 1 4 To tolerate anything less would directly encroach on
the individual rights that the constitutional authors sought to explicitly
web page, many people do not read them, and may therefore be unaware of being
monitored.
110. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967) (explaining that there must exist
a nexus between the item sought and ongoing criminal investigation).
111. See id. at 307-08. The Court discussing that even where very general warrant authority has been given for national security purposes, there have been limits. Id. "Even in
the Espionage Act of 1917, where Congress for the first time granted general authority for
the issuance of search warants, the authority was limited to fruits of crime, instrumentalities, and certain contraband." Id. "[The physical entry of the home is the chief evil against
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." See also Riddick v. New York,
100 S. Ct. 1371, 1379-80 (1980) (citing United States v. United States District Court, 407
U.S. 297, 313 (1980). "It is familiar history that indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of 'general warrants' were the immediate evils that motivated
the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
112. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972). "Where
practical, a governmental search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer
to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected
evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen's private premises or conversation."
113. See id. at 316-17 (citing Leach v. Three of the King's Messengers, 19 How.St.Tr.
1001, 1027 (1765)). "'It is not fit,' said Mansfield, 'that the receiving or judging of the information should be left to the discretion of the officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and
should give certain directions to the officer.'" Id.
114. See id.
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protect. Any search conducted outside the scope of judicial authority
1 15
granted to the government under a warrant is unreasonable.
There are, however, exceptions to this general rule that the government must obtain a search warrant. The Fourth Amendment allows the
government to search without a warrant when a warrant exception exists because the person communicating information has no reasonable
expectation of privacy. 1 16 The ECPA does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic communications. 11 7 Rather an individual
must find such protection within the Fourth Amendment. 1 18 Further115. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971). "Thus the most basic
constitutional rule in this area is that 'searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.'" Id.
116. See Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). In Katz, the Court recognized
that a particular place does not give rise to an expectation of privacy even though traditionally a reasonable person might not think that it would. Id. Although the Court has described Fourth Amendment problems in terms of areas, if has never suggested that this
concept can serve as a solution to every Fourth Amendment problem. Id. Katz was convicted of communicating wagering information by telephone in violation of federal statute.
Id. at 348. Federal agents recorded Katz's telephone conversations while Katz was inside a
phone booth making calls. Id. The government had used a listening and recording device
attached to the outside of the telephone booth, and at trial was initially allowed to admit
these conversations into evidence. Id. However, Katz challenged the admission of such
evidence on the grounds that a telephone booth was a constitutionally protected area. Id.
While the Court technically rejected the petitioner's issue stating that the Fourth Amendment protects persons, not places, they instead chose to address the matter of whether the
particular individual held an expectation of privacy in a particular place, as opposed to
whether a particular place is protected. Id. at 350. The "correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase constitutionally
protected area," but rather that the Amendment protects "individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion.". Id. The Court held that it is the private communication between two individuals that is at issue, regardless of whether the government, or
public, may be able to observe that communication is taking place. Id. at 352. What a
person seeks to preserve as private, even though they might be in a public area, may be
constitutionally protected. Id. The Court found that in a variety of settings an individual
may have an expectation of privacy that is reasonable:
No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a
taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.
Id. at 352.
The government's effort to read the Constitution more narrowly ignores "the vital role that
the public telephone has come to play in communication." Id. Merely because agents could
see that Katz was communicating over the telephone, does not defeat the individual's expectation of privacy. Id. Therefore, what the individual is doing is more important with
respect to Fourth Amendment analysis than where he is when he's doing it.
117. See United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (1999).
118. See id.
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more, even if there was such a reasonable expectation of privacy, it can
be destroyed by some of the exceptions to the ECPA. 119
When an individual is arrested while committing a crime, he cannot
object to a search of his person or home for items connected with that
crime. By analogy, if a cyber-terrorist were arrested while hacking into a
computer, the cyber-terrorist could not object to the search of the computer used to commit the crime. 120 The immediate area where the crime
was committed may be searched without a search warrant, but the government is geographically limited as to what is subject to a warrantless
search beyond that limited scope.1 2 1 An individual has a right against
unreasonable search and seizure only insofar as he has a reasonable expectation of privacy 1 2 2 balanced against the purpose behind the invasion
into the individual's privacy.1 23 However, an expectation of privacy cannot be an absolute bar against searches. 124 Rather, an expectation of
privacy must be both subjectively reasonable and one that society is prepared to objectively consider reasonable. 125 It thus follows that a reasonable expectation of privacy will change over time as society changes
in response to emerging technologies. 126 Therefore, whether the FIDNet
119. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(a)(1).
120. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). "The right [to search] without
a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing
crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as
weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted." Id.
121. See id. (holding that while the government may search the vicinity, such a right
does not extend to places not specifically included in the warrant). "[The arrestee's] house
was several blocks distant from... where the arrest was made" and therefore outside of the
limited scope of a warrantless search. Id.
122. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (citing United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
123. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983). A necessary balance must be
struck between the "nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion." Id.
124. See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 715.
125. See id. (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)) (stating that an
expectation of privacy must be one "that society is prepared to consider reasonable"). This
would rule out persons harboring expectations that others clearly find unreasonable in the
hope of preventing the government from using certain information obtained through a warrantless seizure. Id. For instance, one could not have an reasonable expectation of privacy
walking down the street shouting to a friend that you killed someone last night; nor could
one have a reasonable expectation of privacy while standing in the window of a McDonald's
with a shotgun aimed at several patrons.
126. See id. While the Supreme Court may not always follow this logic, it does seem
apparent that society will accept as reasonable more expectations of privacy as population
increases, thereby limiting the area of seclusion to which one may have become accustomed
and the increase in technology that infringe on basic notions of privacy. An example of
such are radio scanners that are capable of intercepting cellular phone calls.
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plan is constitutional rests on whether a person using a federal civilian
non-public computer network has a subjective expectation of privacy that
society is willing to recognize as reasonable. The problem comes when a
government agency begins to monitor information flowing into and out of
its network.
B.

MONITORING OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN NON-PUBLIC NETWORKS

The FIDNet plan would allow network administrators to monitor
hackers who might try to cause damage to the network by erasing stored
data or planting malicious code.1 27 For example, if a user were accessing
information that they were not authorized to access or destroying computer files, a network administrator could monitor this activity either
personally or through sophisticated software. 128 This is distinguishable
from cases in which an employer sets up a video camera to monitor the
12 9
work area to protect the employer's property from theft or damaged.
An analogy to the FIDNet plan would be a telephone company that
monitors telephone calls when it believes that an individual is not paying
for calls placed. 130 Under the FIDNet plan, administrators would monitor networks to ensure that users would not disrupt the integrity of an
13 1
agency's network.
Although there is no set formula to determine a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular case, 13 2 the Court has looked at a variety
of factors (none of which are present with respect to a person using a
federal civilian computer network) to determine whether an expectation
34
of privacy is reasonable in a particular case. 133 For example, the uses'
127. See Wilke, supra note 63.
128. See Defending America's Cyberspace, supra note 15, at xx.
129. See Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 110 F. 3d 174, 176 (1st Cir.
1997) (describing a telephone company's installation of video cameras for security
purposes).
130. See United States v. Clegg, 509 F. 2d 605, 608 (1975).
131. See Defending America's Cyberspace, supra note 15, at xx.
132. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (citing Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). "We have no talisman that determines in all cases those privacy
expectations that society is prepared to accept as reasonable." Id.
133. See id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977); Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 265 (1960); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)). "Mhe Court
has given weight to such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment:
the uses to which the individual has put a location; and our societal understanding that
certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion." Id. The
Court went on to say that where the expectation of privacy is "based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the Amendment" the more likely protection will
be given to the person. Id.
134. See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 716. The Court has recognized persons with totally private offices, where in the usual course of business no other person has access to the contents of the office, as having an acceptable expectation of privacy in accordance with
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to which an individual puts a location may determine whether society
will recognize that the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 135 Furthermore, a person who voluntarily exposes information to
the public in a mass e-mail cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy over the information and consequently cannot claim Fourth Amend136
ment protection.
Under the FIDNet plan, a system set up to monitor whether intrusions have taken place would not disrupt any reasonable expectations of
privacy. When users are logged onto a network, they communicate with
a government server, 137 and therefore with a government agency. Furthermore, because this communication is flowing to a server, a network
administrator is capable of monitoring what the user is doing on the
server.13 8 This is analogous to a worker being videotaped while working
in an office. Therefore, to the extent that such a disclosure of information
was voluntary, a hacker or user of a federal civilian network cannot
13 9
claim a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Second, an individual cannot claim a reasonable expectation of pri140
vacy while knowingly revealing information to a government agency.
Individual users disclose what they are doing to the federal agency by
societal beliefs. "Within the workplace context, [the] Court has recognized that employees
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police."
135. See Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). (Harlan, J. concurring). Justice Harlan questions the Court's overt pronouncement that a particular place could be
protected. Id. Rather, he says it is the subjective expectations of the individual as well as
the public's willingness to accept such an expectation of privacy. Id. Whereas as here,
where an individual made a telephone call at a pay phone "that it is a temporarily private
place whose momentary occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized
as reasonable." Id.
136. See id. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Id.
137. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
138. See Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F. 2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976) (stating that a governmental agency is subject to the
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures). See also
How does the net work, supra note 107.
139. See Vega-Rodriguez, 110 F. 3d at 181 (stating that it is constitutionally permissible
to videotape employees when they are working especially when they are told in advance
that such taping will take place, and video cameras have "no greater range, then objects or
articles that an individual seeks to preserve as private may be constitutionally protected
from such videotaping only if they are not located in plain view."). If each agency provides
some sort of banner on the login page, then this will further help destroy any expectation of
privacy. Id.
140. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 212 (1966) (holding that where statements were willingly made to the agent there is no expectation of privacy); U.S. v. Amon,
669 F. 2d 1351, 1358 (10th Cir. 1981) (citing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36
(1973); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 347) (holding that Fourth Amendment rights are
not violated because one could claim a reasonable expectation of privacy when they voluntarily submit documents to the IRS).
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communicating through its network. This is clearly distinguishable from
Katz, because in Katz the individual had a subjective expectation of privacy in his communication by going in to a phone booth and shutting the
door behind him so as to exclude any government official from hearing
what he was saying. 14 1 In the network environment, even if such a person did harbor a subjective expectation of privacy, the expectation would
be unreasonable because what the person is doing is directly communicated to the government agency.142 This is analogous to situations
where there is a statutory duty to report certain information to a federal
agency. 143 The courts have held that such voluntary disclosure of such
information leaves no reasonable expectation of privacy. 1 " Furthermore, the communication is meant for no one other than the government
agency that is being contacted. Therefore, a court would likely hold that
the monitoring of a federal civilian non-public networks does not violate
the Fourth Amendment because there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy with respect to this type of communication. 1 4 5 However, in the
event a court were to find a reasonable expectation of privacy, an analysis of the ECPA is appropriate.
To be a protectable communication under the ECPA, a communication has to fall within the statutory provisions. 14 6 An electronic commu14 7
nication within the ECPA is defined as the transfer of data by wire.
When an individual uses a federal agency's network, they will use a computer that is attached either by a wire directly to a federal civilian network or by a modem that is used to dial the access number. 148 Thus, the
141. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
142. See Lewis, 385 U.S. at 212.
143. See Amon, 669 F. 2d at 1358 (citing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36;
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347).
144. See id.
145. See Lewis, 385 U.S. at 212.
146. See United States v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23, 27 (1st Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828
(stating that a communication must fall within the statutory provisions before it will be
protected. Even if it did fall within statutory provisions, the defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy when he broadcast information over his HAM radio.).
147. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (12). The ECPA provides the following definition for electronic communication:
(12) "electronic communication" means any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part
by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include(A) any wire or oral communication;
(B) any communication made through a tone-only paging device;
(C) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of this

title); or
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds.

Id.
148. See Platt, supra note 54.
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communication of actions taking place on a federal network is within the
definition of an electronic communication because data are communicated to the federal agency over its network.
The ECPA generally prohibits the interception of electronic communications by either a governmental agency or by an Internet Service Provider ("ISP").149 The communication of actions on a federal agency's
network is sent over an electronic communication service as defined
within the ECPA.' 50 Interception, as defined in the ECPA, is the acquisition of the content of an electronic communication. 15 1 The content of
an electronic communication is what is relevant for the ECPA governing
interception, not its context. 152 Because federal agencies may not legally
record the contents of an electronic communication, it becomes important
to distinguish between content and the context under which the informa1 53
tion was sent. Content means the substance of a communication.
Therefore, although a federal agency could record such things as when a
transaction occurred, they could not record its substance.
The ECPA recognizes the difficulty of determining whether a person
could have an expectation of privacy that society was ready to accept as
reasonable.' 54 However, the ECPA does not confer any additional expectation of privacy. 155 The courts instead use the traditional test to deter149. See § 2511(1). The section provides in part: "(1) Except as otherwise specifically
provided in this chapter any person who (a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or
electronic communication; shall be punished." Id.
150. See § 2510 (15). Electronic communication service is any "service which provides to
users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications." Id.
151. See § 2510 (4). Intercept includes "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of
any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical,
or other device." Id. See also S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3555. The legislative history makes it clear that the ECPA applies to the interception of
data: "This Amendment clarifies that it is illegal to intercept the non-voice portion of a wire
communication." Id. "For example, it is illegal to intercept the data or digitized portion of
a voice communication." Id.
152. See S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555.
153. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (4). The definition of contents is that "when used with respect
to any wire, oral, or electronic communication, includes any information concerning the
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication." Id. For example, with respect to a
love letter, the content would be the "I love you" attached, while the context would be the
color of the envelope the letter came in. Id. It would not be illegal, for example, to intercept
the time and date that an e-mail was sent, information that, if discovered, could be very
valuable in itself even absent the content therein, while it would be an illegal seizure.
154. See S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. "In this rapidly developing area of communications which range from cellular non-wire telephone connections to microwave-fed computer terminals, distinctions such as [whether there does or
does not exist a reasonable expectation of privacy] are not always clear or obvious." Id.
155. See United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (1999). Congress did not
legislatively determine that a person has an expectation of privacy. Id. In Hambrick,
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mine any expectation of privacy that an individual may have while
communicating electronically. 15 6 Thus, the FIDNet plan must rely on
one of the statutory exceptions if a court were to find a reasonable expectation of privacy within the communication.
The FIDNet plan would likely rely on the electronic communication
service provider exception to the ECPA. 157 This exception provides that
a network administrator may monitor communications in the normal
course of business to ensure the quality of the service and to protect the
property rights of the service provider.15 8 An agency should be cautious
Hambrick had communicated with a 14-year old boy in a internet chat-room, and attempted to get the boy to move in with him. Id. at 505. The government obtained the
online user name of Hambrick in order to determine his identity. Id. The court held that
Hambrick did not "[have] a reasonable expectation of privacy in his name, address, social
security number, credit card number, and proof of Internet connection." Id. The ECPA
does not prevent a Internet Service Provider from turning over information that a subscriber has child pornography on his computer. Id. "The fact that the ECPA does not proscribe turning over such information to private entities buttresses the conclusion that the
ECPA does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information." Id.
156. See id. A person cannot voluntarily expose his data to another. Id. For a person to
have a reasonable expectation of privacy "two conditions must be met: (1) the data must not
be knowingly exposed to others, and (2) the Internet service provider's ability to access the
data must not constitute a disclosure." Id.
157. See Lee memo, supra note 85. "Although each agency is a service provider and can
therefore monitor its own network to protect against network intrusions, this does not
mean, by extension, that GSA is a service provider within the meaning of the statute for
the entire federal government." Id. See also Rotenberg testimony, supra note 79. An individual federal agency can monitor its own network, because it is a service provider as provided for in the ECPA. Id.; see also Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 507. The GSA is not a
service provider as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (15). See Rotenberg testimony, supra note
79. This misses the point, because under the FDNet plan the individual federal agencies
will continue to monitor their respective networks. See supra note 83. Furthermore, the
ECPA provides an exception for electronic communication service providers. See infra note
163.
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(a)(i). The statute provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or on
officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his
employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the
rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider
of that service, except that a provider of wire communication service to the public
shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or
service quality control checks.
Id.
See also Clegg, 509 F.2d at 612 (5 Cir. 1975). "However, we feel that it is quite clear and
we do hold that § 2511(2) (a), at a minimum, authorizes a telephone company which has
reasonable grounds to suspect that its billing procedures are being bypassed to monitor any
phone from which it believes that illegal calls are being placed." See also United States v.
Harvey, 540 F. 2d 1345, 1353 (8th Cir. 1976). "The clear purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (a)
(i), which was designed to allow the disclosure of justified wire monitoring by communica-
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about monitoring all action on a network because the exception is limited
to monitoring only when there is a reasonable basis for believing that its
network integrity is being violated. To the extent that there is a reasonable basis for an intrusion, any information gathered during the course
of ordinary business would be exempted from the ECPA. 1 59 In order for
the FIDNet program to come under this exception, however, a government agency must be maintaining an electronic communication system
60
within the statutory definition.'
An electronic communication service is a service that provides users
the ability to "send or receive electronic communication." 16 1 An electronic communications system is a facility for electronic communications. 1 6 2 Such a system includes telephone companies as well as
ISPs. 1 6 3 In United States v. Monroe, the court found that the Air Force
was the electronic communication service provider within the ECPA because they supplied the means of electronic communication. 1 64 Likewise
under FIDNet, a federal agency with a network that is capable of communicating would probably be covered under the service provider exception. This conclusion is further strengthened by United States v.
Mullin. 165 As long as the information collected relates to the protection
tion carriers for the purpose of criminal prosecution of those who fraudulently use their
services." Id. This is analogous to the FIDNet problem. A government agency that wishes
to ensure that only those people that are permitted to gain access are those gaining access,
so they set up a monitoring facility. Such a monitoring facility is not so concerned with
prosecutions that it will turn over every single incident of person attempting to gain access.
See Defending America's Cyberspace, supranote 15, at xx. Furthermore, the monitoring is
done so as to ensure the quality control of their respective electronic communication
systems.
159. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(a)(i).
160. See id.
161. See § 2510 (15). The relevant portion states that "electronic communication service
means any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or
electronic communications." Id.
162. See § 2510 (14). "Electronic communications system means any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of electronic
communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such communications." Id.
163. See S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. "Existing telephone companies and electronic mail companies are providers of electronic communication
services." Id. Other services like remote computing services may also provide electronic
communication services." Id.
164. See United States v. Monroe, No. 99-0536, 2000 WL 276509, *1 (C.A.A.F. Mar. 13,
2000). See also Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996) (stating
that a city police department is an electronic communication service provider when it provides computers to police with which to communicate).
165. See United States v. Mullins, 992 F. 2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 509 U.S.
905 (1993). The court in Mullins held that as long as the network administrator was acting
within the scope of employment to protect the rights and property of her employer by moni-
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of federal agency's network from unlawful, fraudulent, or abusive use
based on a reasonable belief, the FIDNet plan will meet the service provider exception. While monitoring electronic communication may be
lawful under the ECPA, there is still the issue of whether a federal
agency is permitted under the statute to disclose such information to anyone besides a law enforcement agency. 1 66 Under the President's Plan,
federal agencies will be disclosing information collected to the GSA for
further analysis. The statute prohibits the disclosure of information acquired that is in contravention of the statute. 167 However, as has been
demonstrated, a federal agency is not in violation of the ECPA when it
monitors its networks. 168 Therefore, a federal agency can relate any information to the GSA obtained under §2511(2)(a)(i).

C.

ACCESSING E-MAIL AND FILES ON PERSONAL NETWORK FILES

The question of whether stored communications are afforded a reasonable expectation of privacy remains. A federal agency may wish to monitor files loaded by hackers that have gained access to the network or a
federal employee who has loaded a virus onto the network to cause damage to the network. A computer network can store e-mail or other
files, 169 and often a user will have her own e-mail folder where her received messages are stored on the network. 17° The user can access the
messages by accessing the network's e-mail system. 17 ' E-mail folders
are similar to a mailbox, where other persons, specifically the deliverer,
can look into the box and see the types of letters in the folder. 172 The
crucial difference between e-mail and traditional mail is that network
toring employee's apparent misuse of American Airlines' electronic communication service,
there was no violation of the ECPA.
166. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1) (c) provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person whointentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents
of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know
that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection; shall be punished.
Id.
167. See id.
168. See id; see also Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 452 F. Supp. 392
(W.D. Okla. 1978), affd 611 F.2d 392, 397 (1979) (holding that where an interception is
lawful under §2511(2)(a)(i), Defendant is not liable for public disclosure of information
intercepted).
169. See Encyclopedia Britannica, Electronic Mail (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http'/
www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/7/0,5716,1567+1,00.html>. "Network users typically
have an electronic mailbox that receives, stores, and manages their correspondence." Id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See United States v. Monroe, No. 99-0536, 2000 WL 276509, *1 (C.A.A.F. Mar. 13,
2000).
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administrators can see the contents of the messages. 17 3 In addition,
sometimes messages are not sent directly to the personal e-mail folder
because the folder may be full and incapable of storing more
messages.' 7 4 Messages are then stored in a temporary folder. 17 5 A network administrator, when determining how to redistribute the contents
of the temporary folder, may come across the contents of the message by
looking at the subject.' 76 Likewise, documents may be stored in a user's
network folder, where the network administrator can gain access to
them in order to maintain the network. 17 7 The network administrator,
therefore, acts like the first line of defense against files that may contain
malicious data that could wreak havoc on a network. It becomes necessary to determine the expectation of privacy of a federal civilian network
user when she accesses an agency's network in light of the administrator's active role in ensuring network integrity.
Searches in some areas deserve more Fourth Amendment scrutiny
than others. 178 A search of a person's home, for example, deserves a
high level of scrutiny.' 79 Even the area immediately surrounding a person's home is subject to a higher level of scrutiny than are public
places.' 8 0 While the Fourth Amendment demands exacting scrutiny of
warrantless searches and seizures in the physical space of an individual's home,' 8 ' the FIDNet plan arguably does not involve searches of a
person's home, office, or personal effects. Rather, the plan authorizes
only system administrators to monitor unauthorized entry and anomalous activity of authorized users on the government network. 182
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. Network folders are somewhat analogous to a filing cabinet without a lock,
where many files can be stored, but eyes can peer in and see what is in there. Like the email folders, network administrators have access to personal folders to ensure that the
network as a whole functions well.
178. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
179. See Payton v. New York, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380 (1980). The "Fourth Amendment
law that some searches and seizures inside a man's house without warrant are per se unreasonable in the absence of some one of a number of well defined 'exigent circumstances."

Id.
180. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). "In this light, the rule of
Hester v. United States, supra, that we reaffirm today, may be understood as providing
that an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of
doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home." Id.
181. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). (citing Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford,
141U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). "'No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.'" Id.
182. See generally Defending America's Cyberspace, supra note 15.
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In O'Connor, the Supreme Court held that a person in an office
might have a reasonable expectation of privacy in parts of the office that
are isolated. 183 Although a user accessing a personal folder on a federal
civilian computer network may have a subjective expectation of privacy
that items in a personal folder will not be searched, the search in
O'Connor is distinguishable from the FIDNet plan. First, the fact that
contents of a network folder are protected by a password known only to
the user does not transform the folder's contents into the user's personal
files, giving that user an reasonable expectation of privacy. 18 4 Furthermore, because the users' e-mail folders or personal folders are generally
issued for official duties, they are similar to other types of government
property, for which no reasonable expectation of privacy is recognized.18 5
Because the information is exposed to a network administrator there can
be no expectation of privacy.' 8 6 It therefore becomes apparent that users
of a federal civilian computer network have no reasonable expectation of
privacy.
Even if users had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court
would weigh the purpose behind the imposition of the search when it
183. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987). "Having determined that Dr.
Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, the Court of Appeals simply
concluded without discussion that the 'search... was not a reasonable search under the
fourth amendment.'" Id.
184. See United States v. Monroe, 50 M.J. 550, 558-59 (A.F.C.C.A. 1999) affd 2000 WL
276509. While a user may be able to change his initial password so as to prevent other
user's from accessing his e-mail or other files, network administrators are not denied the
knowledge of the users' password because it is the network administrator's job to ensure
that the network is running at maximum efficiency. Id. "What this means is that the
existence of a personal password is only of passing significance, because appellant was not
allowed a password in order to exclude the EMH administrator, but potential interlopers
only." Id. See also McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., NO. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015
(Tex. Ct. App. May 28, 1999). McLaren equated a personal password with a locker supplied
by a company that had a lock purchased by an employee. Id. at *4. The court distinguished this analogy by stating that a locker is provided to store personal items, not work
items. Id. The court stated that the computer that McLaren used was given to him to
person work-related jobs including the "ability to send and receive e-mail messages," and
as a consequence the e-mail messages were an "inherent part of the office environment."

Id.
185. See Monroe, 50 M.J. at 558-59 (citing United States v. Muniz, 23 M.J. 201, 204-6
(C.M.A.1987), affd 2000 WL 276509 (stating that there is no expectation of privacy in government property "even if the government property in question is capable of being secured."). Furthermore, the court found that because his e-mail folder was issued for
"official duties, his electronic mailbox was akin to other types of government property routinely designated for or assigned to military personnel for performance of their official duties." Id.
One does not acquire a reasonable expectation of privacy in government property designated or assigned under these circumstances." Id. at 558.
186. See id.
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evaluated the constitutionality of the governmental action.18 7 The Court
looks first at the interest advanced by the government. 188 The interest
need not be to protect law enforcement personnel.' 8 9 Rather, the government must simply state that its purpose is to enhance crime protection
and detection, as opposed to protecting the welfare of the law enforcement personnel per se. 190 Second, the Court weighs the public's interest
against the nature and extent of the search to determine whether the
19 1
interest sought outweighs the individual's rights.
In U.S. v. Place, the Supreme Court held that the detention of a
traveler's luggage to identify its contents is constitutional. 1 9 2 Drug enforcement agents received information that Place was carrying narcotics
in his luggage. 19 3 The defendant argued that the police should not be
able to simply assert a general law enforcement interest to overcome the
reasonable expectation of privacy that a person may have, because then
all warrantless searches would be valid where the government has established that the individual may be involved in a crime.' 9 4 The Supreme
Court held that the public has an interest in stopping the illegal transportation of drugs. 19 5 This allows a balance to be struck between the
187. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).
188. See id. (holding that the government has an interest in preventing the noxious
spread of narcotics that has caused so much damage to society, and that therefore the seizing of a suspected drug trafficker's luggage is within the constitutional limits of the Fourth
Amendment). Id.
189. See id. at 703-04.
190. See id. In Place, the Court reaffirmed the requirement of a public interest to be
asserted by the government before they could overcome an expectation of privacy that a
person might have. Id. The Court went on to reject respondent Place's argument that the
government must be able to show that the police were protecting their personal welfare
before a warrantless search, absent exigent circumstances, would be valid. Id. The Court
stated that Terry stood for the proposition that all that the government must demonstrate
is that the initial seizure of the person was used as a means of an "effective crime prevention and detection." See id. In other words, the government need not demonstrate that the
officers are fearing some imminent threat or danger to their person before they may initiate search without a warrant. See id.
191. See id. at 705.
192. See id.
193. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 699 (1983).
194. See id. at 703-04. Place argued that "absent some special law enforcement interest
such as officer safety, a generalized interest in law enforcement cannot justify an intrusion
on an individual's Fourth Amendment interests in the absence of probable cause." Id.
195. See id. The test that the Court has applied is whether the interests of the government are substantial. Id. In other words, the interest sought to be advanced need not be
"independent of the interest in investigating crimes effectively and apprehending suspects." Id. The Supreme Court agreed with the government's argument that seizures are
permitted "on the basis of reasonable, articulable suspicion, premised on objective facts"
that a crime is taking place. Id. The Supreme Court stated that the "[the public has a
compelling interest in detecting those who would traffic in deadly drugs for personal
profit." Id. (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980) (Powell, J. con-
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Fourth Amendment and law enforcement.'
The government's interest in preventing users who illegally access
or misuse their access to civilian computers from disrupting the integrity
of federal civilian computer systems, and ultimately the administration
of the federal government, is as compelling as the interest that was upheld in Place. Any expectation of privacy that a user could possibly have
must be weighed against the government's interest. 1 97 Given the result
in Place, a user's expectation of privacy in e-mail folders or personal network folders would probably not overcome the government's interest in
protecting its networks, if the court recognized a reasonable expectation
at all. 198
If a court found that the user had a reasonable expectation of privacy, an analysis of the ECPA as it applies to stored communications
would follow. Electronic communications under the ECPA includes email.199 Electronic communications, however, do not include cordless
telephone transmissions between a base unit and the cordless telephone. 200 Wire or oral communications are also excluded. 20 1 Communications from a tracking device are also excluded from the meaning of

curring). See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981). The Court in Summers
held that the police could search an individual coming out of a drug house that the police
had a search warrant to search. Id. at 693. Summers challenged the search as unconstitutional. Id. The Court stated that there are those "seizures admittedly covered by the
Fourth Amendment constitute such limited intrusions on the personal security of those
detained and are justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that they may be
made on less than probable cause, so long as police have an articulable basis for suspecting
criminal activity." Id.
196. See Place, 462 U.S. at 705.
197. See id. at 703.
198. See id.
199. See id. Electronic mail is communication between person over public or private
telephone lines. Id. Usually, messages are communicated through a computer keyboard,
and then sent over the "telephone lines to a recipient computer operated by an electronic
mail company." Id. See also McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215 (1998).
200. See S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555.
201. See id. Communications that are made through a paging device that is tone-only
are also excluded from protection under the ECPA, because the Supreme Court has held
that information revealed voluntarily is not protected under the Fourth Amendment. See
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 212 (1966). A tone-only pager informs the user that a
message is sent by emitting a beep. See S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. The user, then, has to calling a predetermined number to retrieve the
sent message. See id. Whereas, a display pager, the kind most persons are accustomed to
today, may display the message visually. Id. Afterwards, the person call telephone the
individual sending the message without the use of a third person. Id. See also United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The Constitution does not proscribe the attainment of"information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed." Id.
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electronic communication. 20 2 Under the ECPA it is illegal to access
stored electronic communications. 20 3 The definition of electronic storage
includes the temporary storage of electronic communication that is intermediate or incidental to the communication. 20 4 Electronic storage also
includes the periodic backup of electronic communication such as email. 20 5 The government can access the contents of electronic storage of
an electronic communication only with a validly issued warrant. 20 6 This
mandate, however, is not absolute, because where the contents of an in202. See S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. A tracking
device can be electronic or mechanical, and is usually authorized by a court order, to permit
an individual to monitor the movement of a person or object. Id. An example would be a
device used to monitor the movement of a car.
203. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (a). The statute reads as follow:
(a) Offense.-Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section whoever(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; or
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility;
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b) of this section.
Id.
204. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (17). The Statute provides
(17) "electronic storage" means(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and
(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for
purposes of backup protection of such communication.
Id.
205. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (17)(B).
206. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (a). The government can obtain the 'contents of an electronic
communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for
one hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent State warrant." Id. It becomes easier for a law
enforcement agency would like to obtain the contents of an electronic message that has
been in storage for more than 180 days with the use of a warrant or by giving notice to the
user of the electronic communication system. Id. The statute provides that
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communications services of the contents of an electronic communication that has been
in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for more than one
hundred and eighty days by the means available under subsection (b) of this
section.
Id. 18 U.S.C. 2703 (b) provides that
Contents of electronic communications in a remote computing service.-(1) A governmental entity may require a provider of remote computing service to disclose
the contents of any electronic communication to which this paragraph is made
applicable by paragraph (2) of this subsection(A) without required notice to the subscriber or customer, if the governmental entity obtains a warrant issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or
equivalent State warrant; or
(B) with prior notice from the governmental entity to the subscriber or customer if
the governmental entity
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dividual's home computer are discovered by an ISP and then turned over
the police, the police may use the information despite the lack of a valid
20 7
warrant.
E-mail and other electronic communications that might be stored in
a personal network folder would be protected under the ECPA. 20 8 However, one exception to the ECPA is particularly relevant to the FIDNet
plan. This exception allows the provider of an electronic communication
service to access any electronic communication that it stores even if another person stores that information. 20 9 In United States v. Monroe, the
court found that the government was an electronic communication service provider within the ECPA definition. 21 0 The government could access any of Monroe's e-mail that was stored on the network. 2 1 ' However,
the government cannot disclose the contents of a communication on its
networks that appeared to relate to the commission of a crime unless the
contents were discovered inadvertently. 21 2 Under the FIDNet plan,
207. See United States v. Kennedy, No. 99-10105-01, 2000 WL 49055, at *5 (D. Kan.
Jan. 3, 2000). An ISP that turns over information about a subscriber's account informa-

tion. Id.
208. See supra note 197.
209. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (c). This statute provides:
(c) Exceptions.-Subsection (a) of this section does not apply with respect to con-

duct authorized(1) by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service;
(2) by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that

user; or
(3) in section 2703, 2704 or 2518 of this title.
Id.
210. See United States v. Monroe, No. 99-0536, 2000 WL 276509, *1 (C.A.A.F. Mar. 13,
2000). See also Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1236. (Stating that a city police department is an
electronic communication service provider when it provides computers to police with which
to communicate). See also United States v. Simons, 29 F. Supp. 2d 324, 325 (E.D. Va. 1998)
affd and rem'd No. 99-4238, 2000 WL 223332 (4th Cir. Feb. 28, 2000). In United States v.
Simons, Simons was employed by the Foreign Bureau of Information Services (FBIS). Id.
The systems operator, while conducting routine service of the network's fire wall noted that
there were a large number of "hits" under the word "sex." Id. at 326. The systems operator
noted that a large number of the hits were located on Internet sites. Id. He, then proceeded to tell the Network Branch Chief of his findings. Id. After looking at the Internet
sites, the systems operator was able to determine that the content of the Internet sites was
related to the business being conducted by Simons. Id. The court found that such a search
of the firewall and the computer was in the course of business of the systems operator of
maintaining the computer network. Id. at 328. When the systems operator examined the
firewall, he was not looking at a particular user's activity. Id. Rather, only after he found
hits that alerted him as to the misuse of the system did he further investigate the activity.
Id. "This search was justified at the inception because it was Mauck's duty as Manager to
monitor Internet use. The search was also reasonably related in scope because it was reasonable that a keyword "sex" search would show whether any users were engaging in inappropriate workplace computer activity." Id.
211. See Monroe, 2000 WL 276509 at *5.
212. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (b) (6). This provision provides:
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therefore, information that is stored would have to be discovered inadvertently. 2 13 FIDNet intentionally looks for anomalous information that
might show signs of intrusion. 2 14 Futhermore, the GSA, and other agencies that are being told the information, are not law enforcement agencies. 2 15 The GSA is a service organization;2 1 6 there is no hint of law
enforcement. Therefore, an agency must not disclose any information to
2 17
the GSA or any other agency that is not a law enforcement agency.
The government should seek to improve the existing technology to
prevent people from gaining initial access instead of thinking in terms of
how much monitoring is necessary once a user connects to the network.
In addition, although users of a nonpublic federal civilian computer network have little or no reasonable expectation of privacy, users may still
subjectively believe they will not be monitored. The government should
disclose such information through a method that prevents user access
until the networks alerts users that they are subject to monitoring.
IV. CONCLUSION
The President's Plan to protect federal agency from cyberterrorism certainly has laudable goals and can operate within the constitutional limitations on search and seizure. However, it may not be necessary to
implement a monitoring program like FIDNet. Rather, the government
has several alternatives to increased monitoring within governmental
organizations. Such alternatives, individually, will not completely dispense of privacy issues on government networks, but each offers certain
(6) to a law enforcement agency(A) if the contents(i) were inadvertently obtained by the service provider; and
(ii) appear to pertain to the commission of a crime; or
(B) if required by section 227 of the Crime Control Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C.A.
§ 13032].

Id.
213. See id.
214. See Defending America's Cyberspace, supra note 15, at xx.
215. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (b) (6).
216. About the U.S. General Services Administration (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <httpi/
www.gsa.gov/aboutgsa.htm>. The mission statement provides the following description
concerning the duties of the GSA:
We provide expertly managed space, supplies, services, and solutions, at the best
value, to enable Federal employees to accomplish their missions. GSA is about
great work environments-wherever government works, whether in an office
building, a warehouse, a national forest, or a government car. In support of this
mission, GSA provides workspace, security, furniture, equipment, supplies, tools,
computers, and telephones. GSA also provides travel and transportation services,
manages the Federal motor vehicle fleet, oversees telecommuting centers and Federal child care centers, preserves historic buildings, manages a fine arts program,
and develops, advocates, and evaluates governmentwide policy.

Id.
217. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(6).
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advantages that might enable the government to lead private industry in
transforming the Internet privacy debate.
The government can achieve its goal of securing networks and giving
effect to network users' subjective expectations of privacy in three ways:
legislation recognizing a greater expectation of privacy in electronic communications; legislation or federal agency regulation requiring a posting
of notice to any person entering the network; and increasing security on
federal networks to prevent access.
The first alternative of legislating a greater expectation of privacy
would be the least desirable because it could give criminals a safe harbor
within which to hide when they are caught. The second alternative,
posting a notice on the entry of a network that users may be subject to
monitoring, is the least expensive method of giving notice to users. Such
a notice should include a link that would have to be actively clicked by
the user, indicating that they understand everything included in the notice. It provides users with knowledge of potential monitoring. Further,
it seriously weakens claims of an objective expectation of privacy because
any user would have submitted to the federal agency that they read and
understood the terms of use of the network.
Finally, the most obvious, but most expensive, means of achieving
secure networks would be to secure the networks at the entrance. In
other words, the focus should be on the door of the network and preventing unauthorized access, rather than on network monitoring when the
individual is already on the network. Such a plan is analogous to leaving
the keys in your car with the doors unlocked and watching as the thief
starts your car and drives away. Agencies should know who is at the
door before the door opens, which is why network security must begin
with who is accessing federal networks.
Similar plans will be applied to networks of private critical infrastructure corporation as well as Internet sites. The same issues will apply. The same alternatives will exist. If the President desires that the
government take the lead in protecting critical infrastructure data, he
should lead by adopting a plan that focuses less on monitoring and more
on preventing access. The more monitoring becomes an acceptable, entrenched alternative, the less likely users will be able to support a objective expectation of privacy.
David Hueneman

